The 
Introduction
For the purposes of this article, the term "market abuse" is used as a generic term referring to both insider trading and market manipulation. 1 In relation to this, it is also important to note that the regulation and enforcement of market abuse laws has been controversial 2 and inconsistently applied in many jurisdictions, 3 including South Africa. 4 It is against this background that this article discusses selected market abuse activities that manifested in several financial markets during the recent global financial crisis. In this regard, market abuse activities such as front running and quote stuffing, dark pools and flash orders, hedge funds insider trading and high yield securities investment fraud, high frequency trading, credit default swaps and short selling will be briefly analysed. This is done to investigate whether the current South African anti-market abuse enforcement framework is robust enough to effectively combat these activities. 5 This is further Quote stuffing is a manipulative tactic which involves the prompt entering and withdrawing of large stock orders by any person in order to flood the market with quotes that other persons have to process, thereby causing them to lose their fair competitive advantage in such stocks. 13 During the global financial crisis, quote stuffing transactions were executed through high frequency trading computerised programs that are capable of distorting and speedily transferring large stocks to the markets. The so-called "flash crash" which occurred in the US's financial markets is a case in point. 14 
Evaluation of the South African Anti-Market Abuse Enforcement Framework
Trade-based market manipulation activities such quote stuffing and front running are not prohibited under the Companies Act. 15 However, these activities are outlawed in the Financial Markets Act. 16 Although this Act does not directly employ the terms "quote stuffing" and "front running", it has similar provisions which discourage these manipulative activities. 17 Nonetheless, it is submitted that this Act should be amended in order to: (a) expressly apply to possible "quote stuffing" and "front running" that might occur in the over the counter commodity and commodity derivatives transactions; and (b) provide a mandatory requirement on the part of the financial analysts or advisors, brokers and other market participants to hold onto their orders openly for specific minimum periods in order not to prejudice investors through quote stuffing or front running. 18 This could enable the Financial Services Board ("the FSB") and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange Limited ("the JSE") to combat quote stuffing and front running in the relevant financial markets in South Africa.
Dark Pools and Flash Orders
Dark pools involve more than one person colluding to buy or sell a security in a bid to create an artificial market activity. After the global financial crisis, in October 2009, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission ("the SEC") proposed new rules to increase the transparency of dark pools of liquidity and non-public trading interest in the listed stocks by requiring timeous disclosure of actionable indications of interest except when specific conditions relating to large orders that promote size discovery are met. 19 This is targeted at minimising market manipulation of interest indications by privately owned dark pools and selective trading which prejudice other investors. 20 On the other hand, a flash order is a practice that allows a person who has not yet disclosed a stock quote to quickly view other stock orders before the public and other interested persons are given a chance to trade in those stocks. 21 According to Schapiro, flash orders were perpetrated through highly computerised and automated trading devices which gave an unfair advantage to such perpetrators. 22
Evaluation of the South African Anti-Market Abuse Enforcement Framework
Trade-based market manipulation provisions contained in the Financial Markets Act 23 do not specifically prohibit dark pools and flash orders. Dark pools and flash orders are also not expressly prohibited in the Companies Act 2008. Given 13 Lauricella & Strasburg "Quote Stuffing" <http://www.investopedia.com/terms/q/quote-stuffing.asp> (accessed 04-02-2014 Lauricella & Strasburg "Quote Stuffing" <http://www.investopedia.com/terms/q/quote-stuffing.asp> (accessed 04-02-2014) . 15 71 of 2008, hereinafter Regulated?" (29-11-2005) 6-7 <http://www.med.govnt.nz/templates/MultipageDocumentPage6861.aspx> (accessed 14-01-2014 S 80. the challenges posed by the computerised electronic trading in securities, the South African policy makers should consider enacting additional provisions to prohibit flash orders and dark pools expressly in all the relevant financial markets. In addition, the FSB and the JSE should impose a strict mandatory requirement on the issuers of securities, brokers and other relevant market participants to disclose their trading interests in certain securities promptly and cautiously in order to detect and curb manipulative dark pools and flash orders.
Hedge Funds Insider Trading and High Yield Securities Investment Fraud
Securities fraud violations such as Ponzi schemes, 24 asset-backed securities market misrepresentations, corporate accounting fraud, prime bank investment fraud involving the fake issuing of certain financial instruments like notes of wellknown financial institutions and the pump and dump manipulative schemes were committed increasingly during the global financial crisis. 25 A Ponzi scheme is a type of high yield investment fraud which attracts persons by low risk investment offers and a guarantee of unusually high and fast profit. During the global financial crisis, this scheme was used to deceive investors to unwittingly conclude investment deals which later made them to lose their money. For instance, in the US, Bernard Madoff was arrested on 11 December 2008 and charged with securities fraud after he admitted that he had operated a US$50 billion Ponzi scheme through one of his companies. 26 Hedge funds 27 insider trading also posed enforcement challenges to several regulatory agencies during the global financial crisis. This was caused, in part, by the fact that hedge funds were insufficiently regulated in many jurisdictions. For example, in the US hedge funds were not fully subjected to any disclosure requirements under the federal securities laws while they were totally unregulated in Australia. 28 Consequently, the SEC's Enforcement Division created a Market Abuse Unit which is, inter alia, required to combat fraudulent market manipulation schemes and has, together with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, the New York Stock Exchange, the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force and the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission begun to investigate hedge funds-related insider trading extensively. 29 Likewise, the UK and Australia stepped up reforms to combat hedge funds insider trading. For example, the UK Treasury published its proposal document entitled A New Approach to Financial Regulation: Judgement, Focus and Stability on 26 July 2010 which recommends the establishment of the Financial Policy Committee, the Consumer Protection and Markets Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority to replace the FSA in a bid to effectively combat fraud and market abuse activities. 30 In Australia, although the Australian Securities and Investments Commission ("the ASIC") is responsible for the general oversight of hedge funds, the debate on whether to regulate hedge funds in line with the International Organisation of Securities Commissions ("the IOSCO")' proposals is still ongoing. 31 In the European Union ("the EU"), the Market Abuse Directive was revised to inter 24 Named after an early 20 th century criminal called Charles Ponzi. 25 See related remarks by Perkins "Mortgage Fraud, Securities Fraud and the Financial Meltdown: Prosecuting those Responsible" (09-12-2009) <http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/mortgage-fraud-securities-fraud-and -the-financial-meltdowm-prosecuting-those-responsible.htm> (accessed 17-06-2013) . 26 He allegedly misrepresented to his investors that they were going to get profits, yet these profits were principal deposits from new investors. He was later sentenced to a 150 years' imprisonment term on 29 June 2009; also see SEC v Stanley Chais (2009) Lewis "2009 Year in Review: SEC and SRO Selected Enforcement Cases and Developments Regarding Broker-Dealers" 2010 56 <http://www.morganlewis.com/lit_SECandYearlyReviewWP_Jan2010.pdf> (accessed 10-06-2013 . 27 21-06-2013 Chossudovsky "Global Financial Meltdown" (2008 ) 4 <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=10268> (accessed 17-07-2013 . 29 See SEC v Arthur J Cutillo and others (2009) Lewis 2010 2-9; 19-21 <http://www.morganlewis.com/lit_SECandYearlyReviewWP_Jan2010.pdf> (accessed 10-06-2013 . 30 These new regulatory bodies are expected to come into force in 2012. Generally see related analysis by Dyer "Overhauling the Regulation of Global Financial Services" (2010 ) <http://www.dorsey.com/dyer.caroline.pdf> (accessed 07-07-2013 alia extend harsher penalties to the persons who engage in market manipulation and insider trading (including hedge funds insider trading) in over the counter derivatives markets. 32
Civ 5681(SDNY) were Stanley Chais was charged for misrepresenting to fund investors that he was managing their investments and, as a result, the SEC brought permanent injunctions, disgorgement of profits and civil penalties against him, for this and other related cases, see Morgan

Hedge funds are privately owned investment funds from different investors (usually wealth individuals or big financial institutions like banks) which are cooperatively managed by an appointed investment manager. Securities Law Practice Center "Spotlight on Insider Trading in Hedge Funds and M & A" <http://seclawcenter.edu/201106/09/spotlight-on-insider-trading-in-hedge-funds-and-ma/> (accessed
Evaluation of the South African Anti-Market Abuse Enforcement Framework
The Financial Markets Act's market abuse provisions do not expressly prohibit hedge funds insider trading and high yield investment fraud. 33 Nevertheless, the Financial Markets Act provides that a central securities depository may hold securities of the same kind collectively in a separate central account, 34 similar to hedge funds which are also separately managed. 35 However, apart from mandating the central securities depository to disclose certain information from its participants to the registrar of securities services and to conduct its services in a prudent manner, 36 the Financial Markets Act does not expressly empower the FSB to combat hedge funds insider trading and commodities derivatives insider trading. The Companies Act 2008 does not expressly prohibit hedge funds insider trading and high yield securities investment fraud but it does, however, prohibit companies from engaging in reckless trading and executing their business under insolvent circumstances and/or with gross negligence in order to defraud investors. 37 No clarity is given as regards the types of companies that are specifically targeted by this anti-fraud provision. Accordingly, it is hoped that additional provisions will be enacted in accordance with other applicable reforms and proposals that were introduced elsewhere 38 to expressly prohibit hedge funds market abuse activities and other securities violations, especially in over the counter markets.
High Frequency Trading
High frequency trading is a manipulative practice that involves persons like brokers, issuers and financial analysts who act in a proprietary capacity to employ sophisticated computerised algorithmic decision-making systems in order to obtain advantage from some minute discrepancies in the financial markets stock prices and then quickly trade in such stocks in large quantities to gain profit. 39 It is stated that high frequency trading by investment banks and hedge funds contributed about 60% to 70% of all stock trades in the US's financial markets during the global financial crisis and in relation to this, high frequency trading profits between US$8 billion and US$21 billion were recorded in 2008. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the SEC formed a committee which recommended the adoption of minimum regulatory requirements such as restrictions on direct access and co-location, the imposition of penalties for rapid order cancellation and basic quoting requirements for high frequency trading related practices. 40 However, it is reported that the enforcement of high frequency trading regulations remains challenging for many regulators because the offenders usually have highly sophisticated and automated algorithmic trading mechanisms that are capable of offering high speed stock order responses and to trade on such stock price movements after a certain threshold is reached. It is submitted that lax or inconsistent regulation of high frequency trading can unfairly allow large financial institutions to engage in market abuse activities and related financial markets systemic risks to the detriment of small investors. The financial markets flash crash of 06 May 2010 is a case in point. In response to this flash crash, the SEC proposed rules to combat risks associated with high frequency trading related practices like erroneous flash orders and naked accesses. 41 Nonetheless, as is the case in the EU and Australia, 42 the SEC has not yet adopted a specific rule to curb high frequency trading related market abuse activities.
32 Paulo 2011 Fondation Robert Schuman 6 & 10 <http://www.robert-schuman.eu/frs-fichecrisefi-qe200-en.pdf> (accessed 04-07-2013 . 33 See ss 78; 80; 81 & 82. 34 S 30(2) Bhupathi "Technology's Latest Market Manipulator? High Frequency Trading: The Strategies, Tools, Risks and Responses" 2010 North Carolina Journal of Law and Technology 377 386; Wagner & Bhala "Is High Frequency Trading Ethical?" <http://sevenpillarsinstitute.org/case-studies-high-frequencytrading> (accessed 04-07-2011) ; also see analysis by Anonymous "High Frequency Trading Regulation" (17-05-2011 ) <http://www.marketsreformwiki.com/mktreformwiki/index.php/High-Frequency-Trading-Regulation> (accessed 04-07-2011 . 40 See Anonymous "The Impact of High Frequency Trading: Manipulation, Distortion or a Better-Functioning Market?" <http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2345> (accessed 17-06-2011 (17-05-2011 ) <http://www.marketsreformwiki.com/mktreformwiki/index.php/High-Frequency-Trading-Regulation> (accessed 04-07-2011 .
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Notwithstanding their fairly wide market abuse prohibition, the Financial Markets Act 43 does not specifically discourage high frequency trading, Internet-based market manipulation, program trading and other related technologically perpetrated market abuse activities. Likewise, the Companies Act 2008 does not specifically discourage the high frequency trading and other related practices. Although the Financial Markets Act 44 provide inexhaustible instances where some practices may be deemed to be trade-based market manipulation, it is submitted that additional provisions should be enacted to expressly prohibit high frequency trading, Internet-based market manipulation and program trading to enable the FSB to combat technologically related market abuse activities in the South African financial markets. The JSE has reportedly boosted its information technology department to enhance its efficiency especially with regard to its clearing systems, Yield-X interest transactions and Equities derivatives by requiring its members to use the Broker Deal Accounting system 45 to enable it to detect market abuse practices involving certain beneficial ownership trades. Nonetheless, it is suggested that the JSE and the FSB should consider employing practically applicable proposals from other jurisdictions such as the back testing process, real-time risk monitoring and market surveillance measures to combat high frequency trading related market abuse activities.
Credit Default Swaps
Credit default swaps are "bilateral contracts designed for credit hedging or speculative investment and issues relating counterparty risk, operational risk and market transparency". 46 During the global financial crisis most of the credit default swaps derivatives were traded on the over the counter markets by bond holders to transfer debt default risk from the buyer to the seller. 47 It is further argued that the complexity and opaqueness of credit default swaps exacerbated systemic risks involving market manipulation and insider trading, particularly in the over the counter markets during the global financial crisis. 48 Both the Group of Thirty and the IOSCO submit that credit default swaps were largely used for speculative purposes giving rise to market abuse activities, increased counterparty risk, operational risk and lack of transparency in the over the counter credit default swaps derivatives markets. 49 In response to these challenges the IOSCO proposed the establishment of an adequate central counterparties' regulatory framework to: (a) promote cooperation and relevant information sharing among the regulators; and (b) mandatorily require financial institutions and market participants to work on standardised credit default swaps to facilitate central counterparties clearing. 50 In the same light, on 08 June 2010 the European Commission ("the EC") president, Jose Manuel Barosso, submitted that member states should consider prohibiting naked short selling and naked credit default swaps in order to empower their regulators to prevent market abuse activities. 51 The EC further proposed that regulators should require all market participants to disclose relevant information in order to increase transparency and to ensure that sellers of credit default swaps are in 43 See ss 78; 80; 81 & 82. 44 S 80(3) . 45 This system keeps the securities records and books of brokerage companies; also see further Loubser "CEO's Statement" <http://www.jse.co.za/ceo/statement/public.JSE.pdf> (accessed 10-10-2013) . 46 07-07-2013 (23-02-2009) <http://www.rcwhalen.com/pdf/cds_aei.pdf> (accessed 07-07-2013) and also see the related remarks and discussion by the G20 London Summit Communiqué which can be accessed at <http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20_communique_020409.pdf> (accessed 17-06-2013) (accessed 07-07-2013) . 51 Buiter Lessons From the Global Financial Crisis 8-11; Vander Stichele "EU Financial Reform: Some Small Steps, but no Fundamental Changes in Sight" (2010) 25-31 <http://somo.nl/dossiers-en/sectors/financial/eu-financial-reforms/newsletters> (accessed 08-07-2013). actual possession of the asset to be sold at the time when it will be due to be delivered. 52 In Australia, the ASIC and other regulators formed a working group to study international developments in order to review the Australian credit default swaps market in line with such developments to promote transparency and to curb counterparty risk and market abuse activity. 53 In the same light, in July 2009 the US Treasury proposed: (a) the implementation of data repositories for uncleared transactions to enhance transparency by mandating central counterparties to report or disclose relevant information to a regulated trade repository, regulators and the public; (b) the establishment of a central counterparty to clear standardised over the counter credit default swaps derivatives. 54 Credit default swaps are not regulated under federal commodities laws but are nonetheless, partially regulated in accordance with the SEC's restricted jurisdiction over security-based swaps and federal bank regulators. 55 Accordingly, the SEC adopted exemptions requirements to allow local credit default swaps users to employ central counterparties and exchange traded credit default swaps. 56 Nevertheless, these requirements are merely contingent upon the central counterparties and/or market participants to choose whether or not to comply with them.
IOSCO Task Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products Technical Committee Final Report 2009 8-5 <http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf > (accessed
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The Financial Markets Act's market abuse provisions apply only to trades conducted on a regulated market and they do not directly or indirectly prohibit illicit or naked credit default swaps derivatives transactions in the over the counter markets. 57 These provisions, unlike the position in Australia and the US, 58 do not specifically empower the FSB and the JSE to develop their own measures to clear standardised credit default swaps and to cautiously allow exchange traded credit default swaps in the regulated markets to prevent market abuse related counterparty risk. Likewise, the Companies Act 2008 does not prohibit naked credit default swaps. 59 On the contrary, the Financial Markets Act provide some general provisions which require an exchange, 60 central securities depository (including an external central securities depository), 61 a trade repository, 62 participant 63 and clearing house 64 to employ security and back-up procedures and necessary measures to ensure that market participants will use an independent clearing house 65 as a central counterparty to clear unlisted securities as suggested by the Group of Twenty ("the G20") and the IOSCO. Nonetheless, it is not clear whether the unlisted securities that can be cleared by an independent clearing house will also include credit default swaps derivatives. On the other hand, the JSE now regulates both the Equities and commodity derivatives markets. 66 However, in contrast to the position in other jurisdictions, 67 the JSE uses a non-standardised derivative instruments system called Can-Do Derivatives which is largely dependent on the terms of investors but traded and/or valued by the JSE and cleared by its own clearing house called Safcom (Proprietary) Limited. 68 It is suggested that the JSE should combat naked credit default swaps by allowing over the counter credit default swaps derivatives to be standardised and cleared by an independent central counterparty.
Short Selling
Short selling is a practice which involves selling securities or assets such as derivatives by the seller without owning them at the time of the transactions, with the intention of buying them back at a later stage but at a much lower price. 69 Where the value of the asset or security in question depreciates during the period between the time of the sale and its actual delivery, the seller will illicitly gain profit. 70 This is sometimes referred to as "covered" short selling. An overview of how short selling transactions are executed is reflected in the figure 1 that follows, which shows that the short seller usually borrows the securities to be sold and later buys them back from the relevant persons or financial markets in order to return such securities to the initial lender.
The short seller will then make a profit when the price of securities in question falls and loses when the price of securities rises to new margins than were previously anticipated. 71 The parties involved in short selling may include an initial lender (original owner of the securities), a broker, a short seller (borrower of the securities), a buyer, securities lender or an exchange and a clearing agency which oversees the clearing of all the securities transactions as indicated in figure 1 below: Adapted from Gruenewald, Wagner & Weber. 72 In contrast to covered short selling as illustrated above, "naked" short selling occurs when a seller agrees to short sell a security within a stipulated period without taking prior measures to repurchase it at a later stage. 73 Comparatively speaking, it is submitted that naked short selling is riskier than covered short selling because the seller is not assured of getting the security sold back at a later period. 74 There has not been any consensus regarding the regulation of short selling. Some commentators argue that short selling is detrimental to financial markets stability 75 while others maintain that prohibiting short selling negatively affects the liquidity and efficiency of the financial markets. 76 Be that as it may, this research submits that naked short selling should be adequately prohibited to prevent market abuse related systemic risks.
In the US short selling has been regulated as early as the 1938 through the price test prohibition (uptick rule). 77 Before the global financial markets crisis, broker-dealers were restricted from short selling through the Regulation SHO. 78 In September 2008 the SEC enforced a temporary short selling ban on options markets to combat naked short selling and other market abuse activities. 79 Moreover, the Regulation SHO was amended to permanently extend the short selling restrictions, especially with regard to equity securities to discourage naked short selling and other market abuse activities. 80 The EC also proposed reforms to: (a) increase transparency in short selling practices; (b) harmonise rules regarding whether to ban short selling permanently; and (c) discourage short selling across the EU member states. 81 The EC further submitted that short sellers must now be in actual possession of the security or asset which they intend to sell and that the European Securities and Markets Authority may, in exceptional cases, impose a restriction or absolutely prohibit naked short selling to curb speculative market manipulation. 82 The author concurs with Culp and Heaton, 83 Goldstein and Guembel 84 and Shkilko, Van Ness and Van Ness 85 that naked short selling may increase market abuse activity in the financial markets 86 and further submits that short selling must be regulated by independent bodies to maintain financial markets efficiency and stability.
Evaluation of the South African Anti-Market Abuse Enforcement Framework
The current South African anti-market abuse enforcement framework primarily deals only with insider trading and market manipulation. 87 Accordingly, there are no market abuse provisions which explicitly prohibit short selling under the Financial Markets Act. 88 Therefore, in contrast to the position in the UK, 89 the US and Europe, 90 the decision to ban short selling has not yet been statutorily considered in South Africa. It is submitted that this gap could give some devious persons an easy conduit to commit market abuse offences without incurring liability. After the global financial crisis, the JSE, in addition to its Broker Deal Accounting system and other surveillance systems, introduced some restrictions on short selling in September 2008. 91 These restrictions were targeted at restoring investor confidence in the JSE Equity derivatives and securities by combating possible short selling related market abuse activities. 92 However, it remains uncertain whether these short selling restrictions are enforced by the JSE itself, or by the courts and the FSB. Given this obscurity, it is hoped that the Financial Markets Act will be fastidiously amended, giving regard to relevant applicable developments in other jurisdictions 93 to expressly prohibit naked short selling.
Concluding Remarks
As discussed above, it is evident that various challenges are still embedded in the South African anti-market abuse enforcement framework, especially, in the wake of some market abuse practices that manifested during the global financial crisis and the combating of such practices in the South African financial markets. 94 Consequently, it is suggested that the Financial Markets Act should be amended in order to enact provisions that directly and expressly apply to possible quote stuffing and front running that might occur in the over the counter commodity and commodity derivatives transactions. 95 It is further submitted that the Financial Markets Act should be amended to provide a mandatory requirement on the part of the financial analysts or advisors, brokers and other market participants to openly hold onto their orders for specific minimum periods in order not to prejudice investors through quote stuffing or front running. 96 Moreover, it is submitted that additional provisions should be enacted to expressly prohibit flash orders and dark pools in all the relevant financial markets. 97 In addition, it is submitted that the FSB and the JSE should strictly impose a mandatory requirement on the issuers of securities, brokers and other relevant market participants to disclose their trading interests in certain securities promptly and cautiously in order to detect and curb manipulative dark pools and flash orders. 98 It is further submitted that additional provisions should be enacted in accordance with other applicable reforms and proposals that were introduced elsewhere to expressly prohibit hedge funds market abuse activities and other securities violations, especially in the South African over the counter markets. 99 Moreover, it is recommended that the JSE and the FSB should consider employing practically applicable proposals from other jurisdictions such as the back testing process, real-time risk monitoring and market surveillance measures to combat high frequency trading-related market abuse activities. 100 It is also submitted that the Financial Markets Act should be amended in order to provide a specific prohibition on naked credit default swaps and appropriate penalties against the offenders. 101 Furthermore, it is suggested that the Financial Markets Act should be fastidiously amended, giving regard to relevant applicable developments in other jurisdictions 102 to prohibit naked short selling expressly. 103 In conclusion, it is hoped that the market abuse challenges as stated in this article will be appropriately resolved for the purposes of combating market abuse activities in South Africa. In line with this, it is further hoped that the recommendations as enumerated in this article will be employed by the relevant stakeholders in the future to enhance the combating of such activities in the South African financial markets. 
